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I. Prologue
The sphere of modern financial economics encompases finance, micro
investment theory and much of the economics of uncertainty. As is evident
from its influence on other branches of economics including public finance,
industrial organization and monetary theory, the boundaries of this sphere are
both permeable and flexible. The complex interactions of time and uncertainty
guarantee intellectual challenge and intrinsic excitement to the study of
financial economics. Indeed, the mathematics of the subject contain some of
the most interesting applications of probability and optimization theory. But
for all its mathematical refinement, the research has nevertheless had a
direct and significant influence on practice.
It was not always thus. Thirty years ago, finance theory was little more
than a collection of anecdotes, rules of thumb, and manipulations of
accounting data with an almost exclusive focus on corporate financial
management. There is no need in this meeting of the guild to recount the
subsequent evolution from this conceptual potpourri to a rigorous economic
theory subjected to systematic empirical examination.1 Nor is there a need
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on this occasion to document the wide-ranging impact of the research on
2finance practice. I simply note that the conjoining of intrinsic
intellectual interest with extrinsic application is a prevailing theme of
research in financial economics.
The later stages of this successful evolution has however been marked by a
substantial accumulation of empirical anomalies; discoveries of theoretical
inconsistencies; and a well-founded concern about the statistical power of
many of the test methodologies.3 Finance, thus finds itself today in the
seemingly-paradoxical position of having more questions and empirical puzzles
than at the start of its modern development. To be sure, some of the
empirical anomalies will eventually be shown to be mere statistical
artifacts. However, just as surely, others will not be so easily dismissed.
I see this new-found ignorance in finance as mostly of the useful type
that reflects our "...express recognition of what is not yet known, but needs
to be known in order to lay the foundation for still more knowledge." 5
Anomalous empirical evidence has indeed stimulated wide-ranging research
efforts to make explicit the theoretical and empirical limitations of the
basic finance model with its frictionless markets, complete information, and
rational, optimizing economic behavior. Although much has been done, this
research line is far from closure. Some hold that the paradigm of rational
and optimal behavior must be largely discarded if knowledge in finance is to
significantly advance. Others believe that most of the important empirical
anomalies surrounding the current theory can be resolved within that
traditional paradigm. Whichever view emerges as the dominant theme in
finance, our understanding of the subject promises to be greatly enriched by
these research programs.
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Although I must confess to a traditional view on the central role of
rational behavior in finance, I also believe that financial models based on
frictionless markets and complete information are often inadequate to capture
the complexity of rationality in action. For example, in the modern tradition
of finance, financial economic organizations are regarded as existing
primarily because of the functions they serve and are, therefore, endogenous
to the theory. Yet, derived rational behavior in a perfect-market setting
rarely provides explicit and important roles for either financial
institutions, complicated financial instruments and contracts, or regulatory
constraints, despite their observed abundance in the real financial world.
Moreover, the time scale for adjustments in the structures of financial
institutions, regulations and business practices is wholly different than the
one for either adjustment of investor portfolios or changes in security
prices. Thus, even if all such structural changes served to accommodate
individuals' otherwise unconstrained optimal plans, current (and perhaps,
suboptimal) institutional forms can significantly affect rational financial
behavior for a considerable period of time.
Consider, for instance, the perfect-market assumption that firms can
instantly raise sufficient capital to take advantage of profitable investment
opportunities. This specification may be adequate to derive the general
properties of investment and financing behavior by business firms on a time
scale of sufficiently-long duration. It is, however, almost surely too crude
an abstraction for the study of the detailed microstructure of speculative
markets. On the time scale of trading opportunities, the capital stock of
dealers, market makers and traders is essentially fixed. Entry into the
dealer business is neither costless nor instantaneous. Thus, margin and other
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regulatory capital requirements can place an effective constraint on the
number of opportunities that these professionals may undertake at a given
point in time. Hence, these institutional factors may cause the short-run
marginal cost of capital for these financial firms to vary dramatically over
short time intervals. Therefore, to abstract from these factors may be to
neglect an order-one influence on the short-run behavior of security prices.
Similarly, models that posit the usual tatonnement process for equilibrium
asset-price formation do not explicitly provide a functional role for the
complicated and dynamic system of dealers, market makers and traders observed
in the real world. It would, thus, be no surprise that such models generate
limited insights into market activities and price formation on this time
scale. The expressed recognition of a nontatonnement process for speculative-
price formation is probably only important in studies of very short-run
behavior. The limitations of the perfect-market model are not however
confined solely to such analyses.
The acquisition of information and its dissemination to other economic
units are, as we all know, central activities in all areas of finance, and
especially so in capital markets. As we also know, asset pricing models
typically assume both that the diffusion of every type of publicly available
information takes -,Mace instantaneously among all investors and that investors
act on the information as soon as it is received. Whether so simple an
information structure is adequate to describe empirical asset-price behavior
depends on both the nature of the information and the time scale of the
analysis. It may, for example, be reasonable to expect rapid reactions in
prices to the announcement through standard channels of new data (e.g.,
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earnings or dividend announcements) that can be readily evaluated by investors
using generally-accepted structural models. Consider, however, the
informational event of publication in a scientific journal of the empirical
discovery of an anomalous profit opportunity (e.g., smaller-capitalized firms
earn excessive risk-adjusted average returns). The expected duration between
the creation of this investment opportunity and its elimination by rational
investor actions in the market place can be considerable.
Before results are published, an anomaly must in fact exist for a long
enough period of time to permit sufficient statistical documentation.
After publication, the diffusion rate of this type of information from this
source is likely to be significantly slower than for an earnings
announcement. If the anomaly applies to a large collection of securities
(e.g., all small stocks), then its "correction" will require the actions of
many investors. If an investor does not know about the anomaly, he will not,
of course, act to correct it.
Once an investor becomes aware of a study, he must decide whether the
reported historical relations will apply in the future. On the expected
duration of this decision, I need only mention that six years have passed
since publication of the first study on the "small-firm effect" and we in
academic finance have yet to agree on whether it even exists. Resolving this
issue is presumably no easier a task for investors. Beyond this decision, the
investor must also determine whether the potential gains to him are sufficient
to warrant the cost of implementing the strategy. Included in the cost are
the time and expense required to build the model and create the data base
necessary to support the strategy. Moreover, professional money managers may
have to expend further time and resources to market the strategy to clients
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and to satisfy prudence requirements before implementation. If profitable
implementation requires regulatory and business practice changes or the
creation of either new markets or new channels of intermediation, then the
delay between announcement of an anomaly and its elimination by corrective
action in the market place can, indeed, be a long one.
Much the same story applies in varying degrees to the adoption in practice
of new structural models of evaluation (e.g., option pricing models) and to
the diffusion of innovations in financial products (cf. Rogers, 1972 for a
general discussion of the diffusion of innovations). Recognition of the
different speeds of information diffusion is particularly important in
empirical research where the growth in sophisticated and sensitive techniques
to test evermore-refined financial-behavioral patterns severely strains the
simple information structure of our asset pricing models. To avoid
inadvertent positing of a "Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court,"
empirical studies that use long historical time series to test financial-
market hypotheses should take care to account for the evolution of
institutions and information technologies during the sample period. It is,
for example, common in tests of the weak form of the Efficient Market
Hypothesis to assume that real-world investors at the time of their portfolio
decisions had access to the complete prior history of all stock returns.
When, however, investors' decisions were made, the price data may not have
been in reasonably-accessible form and the computational technology necessary
to analyze all these data may not even have been invented. In such cases, the
classification of all prior price data as part of the publicly-available
information set may introduce an important bias against the null hypothesis.
All of this is not to say that the perfect-market model has not been and
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will not continue to be a useful abstraction for financial analysis. The
model may indeed provide the best description of the financial system in the
long run.8 It does, however, suggest that researchers be cognizant of the
insensitivity of this model to institutional complexities and explicitly
assess the limits of precision that can be reasonably expected from its
predictions about the nature and timing of financial behavior. Moreover, I
believe that even modest recognition of institutional structures and
information costs can go a long way toward explaining financial behavior that
is otherwise seen as anomalous to the standard frictionless-market model. To
illustrate this thesis, I now turn to the development of a simple model of
capital market equilibrium with incomplete information.
-8-
II. Capital Market Equilibrium With Incomplete Information
In this section, we develop a two-period model of capital market
equilibrium in an environment where each investor knows only about a subset of
the available securities. In subsequent sections, we explore the impact on
the structure of equilibrium asset prices caused by this particular type of
incomplete information.
There are n firms in the economy whose end-of-period cash flows are
technologically specified by:
ik -LIk Elk y +k (1)
where Y denotes a random variable common factor with E(Y) = 0 and
E(r) = 1 and E(Ek) = E(Ek l 1 C 2,... , ,+ l ,.. n, Y) = O , k =n.
Ik denotes the amount of physical investment in firm k and 1k' ak
and sk represent parameters of firm k's production technology. Let
Vk denote the equilibrium value of firm k at the beginning of the
period. If Rk is the equilibrium return per dollar from investing in the
firm over the period, then Rk = Ck/Vk, and
% - % %
R = + bkY + ki (2)R 2=R~+b~a , (2)
where from (1), R = E(Rk) = Ikpk/Vk; bk = akk/Vk and = SkIk/Vk
k = l,...,n. By inspection of (2), the structure of returns is like that of
the Sharpe (1964) "diagonal" model or the "one-factor" version of the Ross
(1976) Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) model.
In addition to shares in the firms, there are two other traded
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securities: a riskless security with sure return per dollar R and a
security that combines the riskless security and a forward contract with cash
settlement on the observed factor index Y. Without loss of generality, it is
assumed that the forward price of the contract is such that the standard
deviation of the equilibrium return on the security is unity. Thus, the
return on the security can be written as:
R + '(3
RR Rn + Y *(3)
n+l n+l
It is assumed that both this and the riskless security are "inside" securities
and therefore, investors' aggregate demand for each of them must be zero in
equilibrium.
The model assumes the standard frictionless-market conditions of no taxes,
no transactions costs, and borrowing and shortselling without restriction.
There are N investors where N is sufficiently large and the distribution
of wealth sufficiently disperse that each acts as a price taker.
Each investor is risk averse and selects an optimal portfolio according to
the Markowitz-Tobin mean-variance criterion applied to end-of-period wealth.
The preference of investor j is represented as:
Uj = E(R W) Wj Var(RWA) ,(4)
2WJ
where W denotes the value of his initial endowment of shares in the firms
evaluated at equilibrium prices; R denotes the return per dollar on his
portfolio; and 6> , j = .. .N.
In addition to an initial endowment of shares, each investor is endowed
with an information set described as follows: Common knowledge in all
-10-
investors' information sets includes the return on the riskless security; the
expected return and variance of the forward contract security given in (3);
and the basic structure of securities' returns given in (2). However, for any
given security k, knowledge of the specific parameter values in (2) may not
be included in some investors' information sets.
An investor is said to be "informed (know) about security k" if he knows
(Rk,bk,ao). All investors who know about security k agree on
these parameter values (i.e., conditional homogeneous beliefs). Let Jj
denote a collection of integers such that k is an element of Jj if
investor j knows about security k, k = 1,...,n + 2, where security n + 2
is the riskless security. Thus, by assumption, n + 1 and n + 2 are
contained in Jj, j = 1,...,N. If Jj contains all the integers
k = 1,...,n + 2, then investor j's information set is complete. Although
the model does not rule out this possibility for some investors, if all
investors' information sets were complete, then the model would reduce to the
standard Sharpe-Lintner-Mossin Capital Asset Pricing Model. Therefore, it is
assumed that investors generally know only about a subset of the available
securities and that these subsets differ across investors.
The key behavioral assumption of the model is that an investor uses
security k in constructing his optimal portfolio only if the investor knows
about security k. The prime motivation for this assumption is the plain fact
that the portfolios held by actual investors (both individual and
institutional) contain only a small fraction of the thousands of traded
securities available.9 There are, of course, a number of other factors
(e.g., market segmentation and institutional restrictions including
limitations on short sales, taxes, transactions costs, liquidity, imperfect
HIt
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divisibility of securities) in addition to incomplete information that in
10
varying degrees, could contribute to this observed behavior. Because this
behavior can be derived from a variety of underlying structural assumptions,
the formally-derived equilibrium-pricing results are the theoretical analog to
reduced-form equations.
As in the Grossman-Stiglitz (1976) single-security model of
asymmetric-information trading, the conditional-homogeneous-beliefs assumption
posited here ensures that all informed traders in security k have the same
information about security k. However, in contrast to their analysis, the
issues of gaming between informed and uninformed investors that surround
trading in an asymmetric information environment do not arise here because
only equally-informed investors trade in each security.
Concern about asymmetric information among investors could be an important
reason why some institutional and individual investors do not invest at all in
certain securities, such as shares in relatively small firms with few
stockholders. However, as is evident from the Grossman-Stiglitz analysis,
such concerns about informed traders are not alone adequate to render this
polar extreme in behavior as optimal. Therefore, I discuss briefly other
types of information cost structures that could lead to the posited behavior
in our model. For this purpose, it is useful to think of information costs as
partitioned into two parts: (1) the cost of gathering and processing data
and (2) the cost of transmitting information from one party to another.
A prime source of information about a particular firm is, of course, the
firm itself. Information required by investors overlaps considerably with the
information managers require to operate the firm. Hence, the firm's marginal
cost for gathering and processing the data needed by investors would seem to
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be small. Nevertheless, as is evident from the extensive literature on the
principal-agent problem and signalling models, the cost of transmitting
this information to investors so that they will use it efficiently, can be
considerable.
The signalling models are focused on the problem of the firm transmitting
to investors specific information such as earnings prospects and investment
plans. The types of costs emphasized are the incentive costs necessary to
induce managers to transmit information and the costs required to make
credible the information they transmit. It is generally assumed in these
models that all public ("non- insider") investors receive the same information
whether they are currently shareholders or not.
In the Bawa-Klein-Barry-Brown models of differential information in which
each investor has the same information set,l the focus of analysis is on
the price effects from differences in the quality of information across
securities (i.e., parameter-estimation risks). In contrast, our model assumes
that the quality of information (i.e., the precision of the estimates of
Rk,bk,Ok) is the same for all securities, and focuses on the price effects from
different distributions of that information across investors. Thus, the
differential-information models cover the price effects of differences in the
depth of investor cognizance among securities, whereas the emphasis here is on
the differences in the breadth of investor cognizance.
Although the types of costs underlying the signalling and differential
information models would surely be an important part of a more-detailed
information-cost structure for our model, there is another type of cost that
logically proceeds them: namely, the cost of making investors aware of the
firm. That is, for Party A to convey useful information to Party B, requires
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not only that Party A has a transmitter and sends an accurate message, but
·also that Party B has a receiver. If an investor does not follow a particular
firm, then an earnings or other specific announcement about that firm is not
likely to cause that investor to take a position in the firm.13 If, for
each firm, investors must pay a significant "set-up" (or "receiver") cost
before they can process detailed information released from time to time about
the firm, then this fixed cost will cause any one investor to follow only a
subset of the traded securities. Because this fixed cost is a "sunk cost" for
existing shareholders, the effective information received by current
shareholders, even from a public announcement by the firm, will not be the
same as that received by other investors.
The firm is of course, not the only source of information available to
investors. There are stock market advisory services, brokerage houses, and
professional portfolio managers. However, much the same argument used here
for the firm can also be applied to the costs in making investors aware of
14
these sources.
Our background information-cost story fits well with the Arbel-Carvell-
Strebel theory of "generic" or "neglected" stocks.1 5 In their theory,
neglected stocks are ones that are not followed by large numbers of
professional analysts on a regular basis. They assume that if the quantity of
analysts following a stock is relatively small, then the quality of
information available on the stock is relatively low. From this, they
conclude that ceteris-paribus, equilibrium expected returns on neglected
stocks will be larger than on widely-followed stocks. Although our simple
model posits no differences in the quality of information across securities,
it is clear in our model that if the number of investors that know about
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security k is relatively small, then security k would fit the definition
of a neglected security in the Arbel-Carvell-Strebel model. With this, we
close our discussion on the information cost structure underlying the model.
With the structure of the model established, we turn now to the solution
of the portfolio selection problem for investor . If wj denotes the
fraction of initial wealth allocated to security k by investor , then from
(2) and (3), the return on the portfolio can be written as:
j = + b + aJL (5)
where: b_ E wn Jb +1 kbk + W n+l
E E / n (wJ)2 21 k k
From (2), we have that E( j lIY) = E(Ej) = 0. Using the condition that
wn+l ' bn+2 =1 E1 wk and substituting b j n- for w we cann+2 1 k I k k n+l
write the variance and expected return on the portfolio as:
Var(Rj) = (bJ) 2 + n (wj) 2 a2 (6.a)1 k k
and
R R + b (R - R) + w (6.b)
n+l 1 k (
where (R R)k Rk -R - bk(Rn+l - R)
From (4), the optimal portfolio choice for the investor can be
formulated as the solution to the constrained maximization problem:
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-j 3 (7) J J
Max [R - 2 Var(R) - kk] (7)
{bJ,wi 
where AX is the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier to reflect the constraint that
investor j cannot invest in security k if he does not know about security
k. That is, i = 0 if k J. and w = O if k J, the compliment tok k
Jj, k = l,...,n. From (6.a) and (6.b), the first-order conditions for (7)
can be written as:
0R -R- 6bb (8.a)
n+l j(8.a)
0 Ak j- 6 - Ak k = 1,...n (8.b)
From (8.a) and (8.b), the optimal common-factor exposure and portfolio
weights can be written as:
b [Rn+l - R]/j (9.a)
w = /(6 a) , k J (9.b)
k k jk i
wJ -= , k Jc (9.c)k J
n
wj = b Z wkbk (9.d)
n+l kk
n
- - Z wk (bk - 1) (9.e)n+2 1 k
From (8.b) and (9.c), we have that
= k Jc (10)
k k j
and kXj = 0 for k J.. By inspection of (10), the "shadow cost"k 3
-16-
of not knowing about security k is the same for all investors.16
Having solved for the individual investor optimal demands, we now
aggregate to determine equilibrium asset prices and expected returns. To
simplify the analysis and focus attention on the effects of incomplete
information on equilibrium prices, we make the further assumption that
investors have identical preferences and the same initial wealths. (I.e.,
6.- 6 and Wj W, j = 1,...,N .) Under these conditions, it
follows from (9.a) that all investors will choose the same exposure to the
common-factor b = b, j = 1,...,N, and that:
R = R + 6b (11)
N
If Dk(- Z wkWi) denotes the aggregate demand for security k,
1
then it follows from (9.b) and (9.c) that:
Dk k N Wak k , (12)
where Nk denotes the number of investors who know about security
k(O < N< N), k = ,...,n. From (9.d) and (9.e), we have that:
D = NWb - nD b (13)
n+l N k-k
and
Zn+ (14)
n+2 NWb - 1 k
Let M W- = NW denote equilibrium national wealth. If Xk(- Vk/M)
is the fraction of the market portfolio invested in security k, then, from
the equilibrium condition Vk = Dk and (12), we have that:
Xk = qkAk/6o 2 (15)
-17-
where qk Nk/N is the fraction of all investors who know about
security k(O < qk < 1), k =1,...,n.17
Because the market portfolio is a weighted average of investors' optimal
portfolios and because all investors choose the same common-factor exposure
b, it follows that the common-factor exposure of the market portfolio is also
equal to b. Moreover, by assumption, security n + 1 and security n + 2
are inside securities and hence, V xn+ = 0 and V 2 = n+2 = 0.n+l n+l n+2 n
Thus, b = ZnXkb and M= ZnV k
From the definition of Ak in (6.b), (11), and (15), we have that the
equilibrium expected return on security k can be written as:
Rk = R + bkSd + k
(16)
= R + bkb + 6dxkk/qk q k = 1,...,n
By substitution for Rk, bk, and ok as defined in (2), into (16) and
rearranging terms, we can derive the equilibrium relation between the market
value of firm k and the distributional characteristics of its end-of-period
cash flow, (Ik,pk,ak,sk); the relative size of the investor base
who know about the firm, qk; and the aggregate-economy variables, (6,b,R
and M). Namely, we have that for k = ,...,n:
Vk = Ik[ k - 6bak - (6sIk)/qkM]/R (17)
Armed with (16) and (17), we now explore the effects of incomplete information
on equilibrium expected returns and asset prices.
To facilitate the analysis, let Vk and Rk denote the equilibrium
market value and expected return on firm k if all investors were informed
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about firm k (i.e., qk = 1). If we hold fixed the aggregate-economy
variables (6,b,,R and M), then from (17), we have that:
Vk = Vk -6(1- qk)k I /(qMR) (18)
By inspection of (18), we have that the market value of firm k will always
be lower with incomplete information, and the smaller the investor base, the
larger is the difference.
To see the connection between this effect on market price and the shadow
cost of incomplete diffusion of information among investors, let
k(- ZN/N) denote the equilibrium aggregate shadow cost
(per investor) for security k. From (10), we have that for k = l,...,n:
Xk =(N - Nk )Ak/N (19)
-(19q)A
=- (1 - qk)k 
From (15), we have that in equilibrium, Ak > 0 because xk > 0.
Hence, from (19), Xk > 0 with equality holding only if all investors
know about security k (i.e., qk = 1).
2and x 22= 2 2By definition of k nd = V2 and x = V/M.
and Xk' Skk kk k k
It therefore follows from (15), (18), and (19) that:
Vk = Vk/[l + Xk/R] (20)
Note: Xk has dimensions of incremental expected rate of returh and R
equals one plus the riskless rate of interest. Hence, from (29), the effect
of incomplete information on equilibrium price is similar to applying an
additional discount rate. Indeed, because Rk IkPk/Vk, we have
from (20) that the incremental equilibrium expected return on security k is
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proportional to its shadow cost: Namely, for k = 1,...,n:
k k k(Rk/) (21)
As noted at the outset, in the complete-information case (qk 1,
k = 1,...,n), the model reduces to the Sharpe-Lintner-Mossin Capital Asset
Pricing Model. In that model, all investors hold perfectly-correlated
mean-variance efficient portfolios and therefore, the market portfolio is
mean-variance efficient in equilibrium. The well-known Security Market Line
relation among equilibrium expected returns follows directly from this
equilibrium condition.
Because (18), (20), and (21) detail the effects of incomplete information
holding fixed the aggregates b, R and M, they cannot be used directly to
compare the aggregate incomplete-information equilibrium with the aggregate
complete-information one. We can, however, use them to examine the Security
Market Line relation that applies in the incomplete-information equilibrium.
If RM denotes the return on the market portfolio, then R = l1 XkRk
because x + = x+ 2 = 0. From (2) and the condition that x b = b, we
have that Var()=lk =k a If we define in standard fashion, the
beta of security k, k' to be the covariance of the return on security k
with the return on the market portfolio divided by the variance of the market
return, then we have that, for k = 1,...,n:
o b T$/( (22) k [bkb + xkc 2]/Var(R.) (22)k k Kk
From (19) and (22), we can rewrite (16) as:
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Rk R + bkb + 6xka + Xk
(23)
= R + Var( )k+ k
If we multiply (23) by xk and sum from k = 1 to n, we have that:
R - R = Var(R) + . (24)
where XM n £ x X is the weighted-average shadow cost of incomplete
information over all securities. Substituting for Var(RM) from (24) into
(23) and rearranging terms, we have that:
Rk - R = k( RM - R) + Xk - kXM (25)
Using the standard notation, ak' for the discrepancy between a security's
equilibrium expected return and the Security Market Line, we have from (25)
that:
ak = Xk -kM (26)
Because a necessary and sufficient condition for the market portfolio to
be mean-variance efficient with respect to all available securities is that
Uk = 0, k = 1,...,n, it follows from (26) that the market portfolio will
not be mean-variance efficient in the incomplete-information model. Indeed,
given equilibrium prices, the optimal combination of risky assets for a
fully-informed investor {wk} is given by (9b), and hence, the
difference between this portfolio's holdings and the market portfolio are
given by:
* 2
wk k X k/6G 2 k = l,... n . (27)
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In the section to follow, we use comparative statics to examine further
the equilibrium structure of asset prices and discuss its possible connection
with observed empirical anomalies. In Section IV, we examine the effects of
incomplete information on firm investment decisions and provide at least a
partial basis for the endogeneous determination of qk. Section V addresses
some pending issues surrounding the model including the introduction of
financial institutions and other types of investors, and touches on some of
the reasons why information diffusion need not be complete.
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III. A Cross-Sectional Study of the Equilibrium Structure of Asset Returns
Assuming an equilibrium as derived in Section II, we use comparative
statics to analyze cross-sectional differences among expected returns on the
available securities. Although theoretical in nature, the analysis uses the
same methodological approach commonly employed in empirical studies of
equilibrium asset return structures.
Because we are analyzing cross-sectional differences among securities and
not comparing the same security in different equilibria, the aggregate
variables, R, b, 6, RM, Var(RM), are held fixed. By inspection of
(16), the four parameters that cause cross-sectional differences in
equilibrium expected returns are: bk, the exposure level to the common
2
factor; Xk, the relative size of the firm; ak, the firm-specific
component of the firm's return variance (which also captures the degree of
nonsubstitutability of other securities for security k); and qk, the
relative size of the investor base (i.e., degree of "investor recognition")
for security k.
Define the elasticity of the expected excess return on security k,
Rk - R, with respect to parameter y, by f(y) - d logiRk - RI/d log(y).
From (16), we have that:
W(bk) = qkbkb/(qkbkb + xk) > (28.a)
2 (
V(x) x /(qbb + x ) > 0
(28.b)
= 1 - k(bk)
(k) = (xk) > 0 (28.c)
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qk ) - (Xk) < 0 (28.d)
By inspection of (28), expected returns will tend to be higher on firms
with larger common-factor exposure, larger firm-specific variance, and larger
size. Expected returns will tend to be lower on better-known firms with
relatively larger investor bases. The magnitudes of these differences will,
of course, depend on the parameter values. All shareholders in firms whose
returns are highly correlated with the common factor have available a close
substitute investment (i.e., security n + 1) and hence, different firm sizes
or investor bases among such firms will have a small effect on expected
returns. Indeed, for firms where xkak/qk << bkb , (x k) = (a) = (qk) 
and (bk ) _ 1. Such is usually taken to be the case in the standard
complete-information model with a large capital market where it is assumed
that qk = 1 and xk << 1 for k = 1,...,n. However, in the model
presented here, it is entirely possible for xk << 1 and for
XkOk/qk to be of a similar order of magnitude to bkb if
qk << 1. That is, it is not the size of the firm relative to national
wealth, (xk Vk/NW) that matters, but instead, the size of the firm
relative to the aggregate wealth of the investors in the firm (xk/qk
= V /N W).k k
To explore this point further, consider the findings that would occur if
one tested the Capital Asset Pricing Model in the usual fashion but in an
environment described by the model of Section II. The standard test is the
Security Market Line relation, Rk - R = k(RM - R) + ak, where the
null hypothesis is that k = 0, k = 1,...,n. As Roll (1977) has shown,
this is equivalent to the test that the portfolio selected for the market
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portfolio is mean-variance efficient relative to the securities selected for
the sample.
As was shown in (26), ak will not equal zero for each k in our
model, and hence, the CAPM does not obtain. However, more can be said about
the nature of the deviation. Consider a cross section of securities with the
2
same parameter values for qk, ok and xk, but different values
for the common factor exposure, bk. It follows from (15) and (19) that
these securities will all have the same Xk value. From (22), Rk
will differ across these securities with ak/3bk > 0. For this
sample, it follows from (26) that:
aa
k
_Xk XM< (29)
Thus, if we were to examine a cross section of these securities, we would find
that ak is a systematically decreasing function of 8k and that the
empirical line in the (k,Rk) plane is "too flat." This finding is
consistent with the empirical results reported by Blume and Friend (1973),
Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972), and Fama and MacBeth (1973).
By inspection of (22), tk does not depend on qk and in the
empirically-relevant case where xk << 1, it-is essentially determined by
bk. and qk' and not bk.bk. Xk depends only on xk,Ok and and not b
Hence, in large samples of stocks stratified only by their betas, one could
perhaps argue that E(Xk{Ik) is the same for all stocks and
therefore, equal to XM. In that case, we have from (26) that for the
total sample of stocks:18
E(akl3 k) = (1 - k)XM
III
(30)
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Black (1972) develops a modified CAPM with a "zero-beta" factor that
predicts that ak = (1 - k)(Rz - R) where Rz - R is the expected excess
return on a zero-beta portfolio of securities with positive variance. Our
result (30) is consistent with the Black model's prediction if the securities
are stratified by beta alone. However, unlike the Black model, our model
predicts that alpha depends on other characteristics in addition to market
risk. Consider a cross section of securities with the same market risk,
Bk' From (26), we have that for qk < i:
- 6(1 - qk)xk/qk (31.a)
=k 6(- 1 q )k/q (31.b)
- Xk k/qk
Among securities with the same market risk, we have from (31.a), that firms
with larger firm-specific variance will have larger alphas. This finding is
consistent with empirical findings [cf. Friend, Westerfield, and Granito
(1978)] that expected returns seem to depend on both market risk and total
variance.
Among firms with the same total volatility and the same relative degree of
investor recognition, we have from (31.b), that the relatively larger firms
will have larger alphas. Although the analysis is cross sectional, this
result is suggestive of significantly downward-sloping demand curves for some
securities.
The prediction of (31.b) appears to conflict with the empirical findings
_____·____1_1_________
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of Banz (1981), Reinganum (1981), Schwert (1983) and others that smaller firms
tend to have larger alphas. They also report that this size effect is
considerably weaker for the post-war period. Moreover, Reinganum (1983), Keim
(1983), Roll (1983), and Constantinides (1984) find that the small-firm effect
seems to apply only in the early part of the month of January and suggest that
year- end tax selling is a possible explanation.
The effect of size on alpha in (31.b) is a conditional prediction for a
cross section of securities with the same Ok and qk, whereas the
cited empirical evidence is not. Therefore, the appropriate
comparative-static analysis for comparison with the empirical results on size
is dac/dxk = a /axk + ( k/ + qk)dqk/dxk. As ank k kk k k k k k k k
empirical matter, smaller firms tend to have larger total variances and
smaller correlations of their returns with the general market (i.e.,
do2 /dxk < 0). Smaller firms generally have many fewer shareholders
than larger firms, and hence, one would expect dqk/dxk to be strongly
positive. From (31.c), our model predicts that more-widely known firms with
larger investor bases will have lower alphas. Thus, it is possible, (but
surely not required in our model), that dak/dx k < 0 even though
aak/axk > 0.
The empirical findings of Barry and Brown (1984) and Arbel, Carvell and
Strebel (1983) can be interpreted as evidence consistent with the predictions
(31) of our model. Barry and Brown analyze returns on samples of New York
Stock Exchange stocks stratified by beta, size and the period of time since
listing. They use the Fama-MacBeth (1973) procedure to control for
interactions among the variables, and find strong interactions between the
effects of size and listing period and between size and beta. Their analysis
III
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confirms the previously-discussed Banz-Reinganum-Keim results for the size
effect itself. However, they also report that "Controlling for size, beta and
the interactions between the variables, there is a listing effect, and this
effect persists in the post-war period as well as when the month of January is
excluded from the data" (p. 292). Addressing the effect of the interaction
between size and listing period on excess returns, Barry and Brown (p. 293)
find that "In fact, this interaction effect is more significant than the size
effect per se."
Although surely not the expressed intent of Barry and Brown, if their
listing period is viewed as a positively-associated proxy variable for our
qk' then their findings are consistent with our (31c). Because among
smaller firms especially, xk is likely to be inversely related to both
qk and a2, the strong effect on excess returns from the interaction
of size and listing period is also consistent with (31a) and (31c). In (31b),
the effect of size per se on ak is small if either ok is small
or qk large.
In examining the evidence for their theory of "neglected" stocks, Arbel,
Carvell and Strebel (1983) study the returns on samples of stocks stratified
by beta, size and the degree of institutional investor holdings of the stock.
For the period 1971-1980, they report (p. 5) that on a risk-adjusted basis,
there is a strong negative relation between excess returns and the degree of
institutional holdings and that this effect persists even when controlled for
size. Moreover, they claim that there is no systematic small-firm effect if
one controls for institutional holdings and beta. As noted in Section II, a
small qk in our model would correspond to a neglected stock in their
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model. Thus, their measure of institutional concentration is a
positively-associated proxy variable for qk and their findings are
consistent with (31).
From (26), the widely-held stocks with qk 1 will have
ak - 13kXM' and therefore, for this top-tier of stocks, the
qualitative predictions of our model and the Black model will coincide. For
even the largest of firms, xk << 1. From (31), one would thus expect
that important cross-sectional differences among securities' expected returns
from factors other than market risk, will tend to be concentrated among
lesser-known stocks with small investor bases (i.e., qk << 1).
To provide a sense of the potential magnitudes of these non-market-risk
parameters on equilibrium returns, we present a few numerical examples. A
2 2typical annual variance rate for stocks is (bk + ak =) 0.16. If
half of that variance is attributed to the common factor, then ak = 0.08.
Empirical studies of aggregate risk aversionl9 suggest that 6 = 2 is
reasonable. It follows from (15) and (19) that Xk = .16(1 - qk)xk/qk.
Representative of the largest and best-known stocks, General Electric,
Ford, and IBM have market values per shareholder of approximately $53,000,
$27,000 and $97,000, respectively. If there are about 45 million investors in
the aggregate, then, under the hypotheses of our model, the corresponding
qk values computed from the number of shareholders of these companies are
.011, .007, and .017. It is readily apparent that if only individual
investors held these stocks, then the implied Xk values for these large
well-known stocks would be enormous. Such naive calculations, however, vastly
overstate the Xk for these stocks. First, both the total variance and
the fraction attributed to firm-specific variance are substantially smaller on
III
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these stocks than on a typical stock. Second, and much more important, a
large fraction of their shares are held by financial institutions (e.g.,
mutual funds, commingled trusts and pension funds) and hence, from an economic
perspective, the effective number of individual shareholders in such firms is
many times larger than the reported number. Therefore, from these data alone,
one cannot reliably assess whether the Xk values for such stocks are of
any significance.
Consider, however, a relatively-small, hypothetical stock with a $200
million market value and no important institutional shareholders. If the
aggregate market value of all stocks were $2 trillion, then xk = .0001, a
tiny fraction of the total market. Nevertheless, if this firm had 22,500
shareholders (a substantial number for a listed firm of this size), then the
implied shadow cost Xk would exceed .03 and the equilibrium expected
return would be 300 basis points larger than in the corresponding
complete-information model with qk = 1. Thus, one cannot reject
out-of-hand, the possibility that the incomplete diffusion of information
among investors has an empirically-significant impact on equilibrium expected
returns, and especially so, for smaller firms with little institutional
following.
To underscore the point, we compute the market value and market value per
shareholder for a sample of 1387 firms for which data on the number of
shareholders were available on the Compustat tapes. The firms were ranked on
total market value and assigned to one of ten groups with the same number of
stocks in each group. For December 31, 1985, the market value of each group
as a fraction of the total and the average market value per shareholder for
each group as a fraction of the average for the sample, are presented in
Table 1.
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Table 1: Distributions of Market Value and Market Value
Per Shareholder (1387 firms)
December 31, 1985
Market Value
of Group/
Market Value
of Sample
(%)
0.11
0.33
0.69
1.21
1.97
3.24
5.28
8.65
15.05
63.47
Group
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Cumulative
Market Value
(%)
0.11
0.44
1.13
2.34
4.31
7.55
12.83
21.48
36.53
100.00
Market Value
per Shareholder/
Average for Sample
0.161
0.371
0.545
0.793
0.972
1.127
1.257
1.490
1.348
1.957
Indicated
qk/qlO
.02
.03
.04
.05
.06
.09
.13
.18
.34
1.00
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As in Barry and Brown (1984, p. 289, Table 1), the distribution of firm
sizes in our Table 1 is very skewed with the top 10 percent of stocks
accounting for over 60 percent of the market value of all firms and the top
two groups almost 80 percent. In contrast, the distribution of market value
per shareholder is more symmetric with the average holdings in the fifth group
close to the average for the sample.
From the earlier discussion of whether smaller firms would have larger
alphas, a sufficient condition for dak/dxk < 0 is that d(xk/qk)/dx k 0.
If market value per shareholder is accepted as a good empirical proxy for
xk/qk, then inspection of Table 1 suggests that as an empirical matter,
the opposite is the case with d(xk/qk)dxk > 0. However, as noted for
the examples of General Electric, Ford, and IBM, these numbers have a
significant upward bias for larger firms that have a disproportionally-larger
fraction of institutional shareholders.
Even with this bias, the rate of increase in market value per shareholder
is substantially smaller than for xk itself. That is, although the
aggregate market value of firms in the top group is almost 600 times that of
the bottom group, the corresponding market value per shareholder comparison is
only 12 times. This finding, of course, does no more than quantify the
well-known fact that smaller firms tend to have fewer shareholders than larger
firms. Since in our model, [xk/(Vk/ )]/[x/(V/N )] = qk/qj, these ratios
are also presented in Table 1 using the q for the top group as "numeriare."
These measures are rather crude estimates for the parameters specified in the
model. Nevertheless, they do provide some indication that the qk values
for the lower 80 percent of firms are considerably smaller than for the large
firms. Because it is differences in qk which provide all the differences
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between our model and the complete-information CAPM, these preliminary results
provide a reasonable basis for further empirical study of the model.
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IV. Firm Behavior and The Determination of Its Investor Base
In the development of our model, the information sets of investors
{Jj are treated as part of their initial endowments and hence, the
distribution of the qk values across firms is exogeneously specified. In
the previous section, we used comparative statics analysis to study
cross-sectional differences among firms' equilibrium expected returns. In
this section, we examine the investment behavior of an individual firm and the
role of the firm in determining the size of its investor base, Nk = qkN .
Throughout the analysis, it is assumed that the management of the firm makes
its decisions in the best interests of the current shareholders and that this
interest is best served by maximizing the current market value of the firm.
In Section II, the focus of our discussion on information cost structures
was on the fixed costs that an investor must pay before detailed substantive
information about the firm can be processed into a portfolio decision.
Investors that are not aware of the firm in this sense will not become
stockholders of the firm. If an increase in the size of the firm's investor
base is in the best interests of the current stockholders, then management
should expend resources of the firm to induce investors who are not currently
shareholders to incur the necessary costs of becoming aware of the firm.
From (16) and (28.d), we have that:
k (32)
_1q - k kXk /qk (32)Qk k
and from the identity, Vk - IkPk/Rk, we have from (32) that:
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3Vk 2 2
= V 6x /q (33)
qk- = Vkxkak/qk (33)
Ceteris paribus, from (32) and (33), an increase in the relative size of the
firm's investor base will reduce the firm's cost of capital and increase the
market value of the firm. Thus, in our model, managers of the firm have an
incentive to expand the firm's investor base. As is evident from (32) and
(33), the magnitude of the effect will be greatest for lesser-known firms
(with small qk) and for firms with large firm-specific variances.
It is, of course, possible for the investor base to increase without the
firm spending anything. For example, a newspaper or other mass media story
about the firm or its industry that reaches a large number of investors who
are not currently shareholders, could induce some of this number to incur the
set-up costs and follow the firm. Having done so, in our model, these
investors would evaluate the detailed substantive information about the firm,
become new shareholders, and the value of the firm would rise.20
It should be stressed that the current shareholders may already know all
the information contained in such stories. Nevertheless, if the form of the
prior public releases of the information did not capture widespread attention
among investors who do not follow the stock and if the new form does, then the
firm's investor base will increase and the stock price will rise. Thus, our
model is consistent with the observation that stock price sometimes reacts to
a broad and widely-circulated report about the firm, even when all the
substantive information in the report has been previously announced.21
Although not mutually exclusive, the techniques used and resources
expended by the firm to expand its investor base are logically separable from
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those used to provide substantive information that existing shareholders can
use to evaluate their portfolio position in the firm. Thus, our model
provides a rationale for expenditures on advertising about the firm that is
targeted for investors and on public relations designed to generate stories
about the firm in the financial press. In the standard financial-equilibrium
models, there is no purpose for expenditures that increase the visibility of
the firm in the investment community without providing new and meaningful
information for investor evaluation of the firm.
Although not directly an incomplete-information issue, the existence of
prudent-investing laws and traditions as well as other regulatory constraints,
can also rule out investment in the firm by some investors. The effect of
these constraints on investor behavior is captured in our model because these
investors act as if they did not know about the firm. Thus, the firm can also
expand its investor base by spending resources to make the firm an eligible
investment for these investors (e.g., to have the firm listed for trading on a
national exchange or to have its securities rated by outside agencies).
As these examples suggest, the process of inducing investors who are not
currently shareholders, to follow the firm's securities is not unlike that
used to market the firm's products. It is, therefore, reasonable to assume
that the cost structure for the firm-to expand its investor base will be
similar to other marketing cost functions. Let F(Nk) denote the cost to
firm k of creating an investor base of Nk shareholders where we posit
F(O) = 0.22 We assume that marginal cost, dF/dNk F'(Nk) is
strictly positive and that marginal cost increases with the number of
investors already informed (i.e., F"(Nk) > 0). Since the model of
Section II posits that the total investor population, N, is very large, we
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further assume for analytical convenience that F'(N)- .
Facing this cost function, managers of firm k will choose the amount of
resources to spend on expanding the investor base so as to maximize [Vk -
F(Nk)]. From (17), the optimal Nk will satisfy:
F'(Nk) = 62I2/RNk . (34)
From the strict convexity of F and F'(N) = a, (34) has a unique solution
with 0 < Nk < N. From this convexity and (34), it follows that the
optimal-size investor base is an increasing function of the firm-specific
component of the variance, measured in terms of end-of-period, dollar cash
flows. The effect of macro variables on the optimal base is that Nk
increases with greater investor risk aversion, decreases with larger per
capita wealth, and decreases with the interest rate.
Suppose the management of firm k contemplates increasing the scale of
investment in the firm. As in the cross-sectional analysis in (28), let
(Ik) denote the elasticity of the equilibrium expected excess return,
Rk - R, with respect to a change in i . From (17) and
Rk Ikpk/Vk, we have that:
Rk 2 2
v(k) = ( )( qk) kbkb + k (35)
By inspection, the expected return required by current investors to hold
shares in firm k increases with Ik. Moreover, from the discussion in
Section III, the magnitude of (I k) can be significant for firms with
relatively small investor bases (qk << 1) and relatively larger firm-
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specific variances. Such firms will face significantly downward-sloping
investor demand curves that should be taken into account in their investment-
financing decisions. Thus, our model provides characteristics for determining
whether a downward-sloping demand curve or perfect substitution is a better
descriptor for a firm's stock price response to changes in the supply of its
shares.
From (33) and (34), if management decides to expand the size of the firm,
then it should also increase its investor base. The management thus chooses
Ik and Nk so as to maximize [Vk - i - F(Nk)]. From (17), the
first-order condition with respect to k can be written as:
Ik NkW[vk - R - bak]/26sk , (36)
where it is understood that Ik = 0 if [lk - R - bak] < 0.
From (36), the optimal quantity of investment is smaller than in the
corresponding complete-information model because Nk < N. The optimal
Nk is derived from (34) which by substituting for Ik from (36), can be
written as:
F'(N k) = W[( k -R - ba )/s ]2/4R (37)k k k k
Thus, (36) and (37) complete the general equilibrium specification of our
model by providing an endogeneous determination of the level of production and
the size of the investor base for each firm.
Our analysis suggests that expansion in the firm's investor base and
increases in investment by the firm will tend to coincide. If exogeneous
events cause the investor base of the firm to expand [either directly or by
shifting downward the marginal cost function, F'(Nk)1, then the firm's cost
_II_ _I_ ______
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of capital will fall and it will be optimal for the firm to increase its
investment. If other events lead the firm to increase investment, then
generally, the firm will also want to increase its investor base. In either
case, to provide the additional capital for new investment will often require
the firm to issue new securities.
If the firm underwrites its own securities using, for example, a rights
offering to its existing security holders with a subscription price
substantially below market, then the firm is likely to succeed in raising the
new capital needed for investment. However, in our model, such a rights
offering is no more likely to increase the size of the firm's investor base
than the payment of a stock dividend or a stock split. Thus, the new
securities will largely be held in the portfolios of the firm's current
security holders.
If, instead, the firm undertakes a negotiated underwriting through an
investment bank with broad distribution capabilities, then the firm can use
the underwriting to both raise new capital and increase its investor base.
Indeed, if the latter is a particularly important objective, then the bank and
the terms of the deal can be chosen so as to maximize the number of new
shareholders who buy the securities. If the underwriter succeeds in inducing
new investors to purchase and follow the firm's stock, then the benefits to
the issuing firm can exceed simply the placement of the new securities in
other-than-existing shareholders' portfolios. These new investors become part
of the base to support secondary-market trading in all the firm's securities
as well as future primary offerings.
Thus, our model provides a framework for evaluating the benefits and costs
of negotiated underwritings versus rights offerings. At least a part of the
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underwriting costs can be treated as expenditures for expanding the investor
base of the firm. This framework is entirely consistent with models that use
asymmetric information and reputation to examine this issue. For example, the
reputation of the investment bank is certainly a possible explanation for its
ability to expand the firm's investor base at a lower cost than if the firm
attempted to do so on its own.
Because the benefits are likely to be greatest for lesser-known firms with
large firm-specific variances, perhaps the best class of underwritings to
examine for these effects is the closely-held firm undertaking an initial
public offering. As indicated in earlier discussion, wide-spread publicity
about a firm or industry can either make investors more receptive to finding
out about the firm if the publicity is favorable, or less receptive if it is
not. Although the firm and its underwriter can use public relations
activities as an attempt to stimulate favorable media coverage, such attempts
are likely to be marginal in generating media reports and influencing their
content. Nevertheless, these reports can significantly change the cost of
increasing the firm's investor base, either lowering it with favorable reports
or raising it with unfavorable ones.
If, at a point in time, several articles appear in the financial press
indicating that initial public offerings generally are a fertile area for
investors to investigate, then the cost of a successful initial offering is
likely to decline for all firms and the number of such public offerings will
rise. Favorable media coverage of an industry will have similar effects, but
more selectively. Thus, our model is consistent with both macro "waves" of
initial public offerings and the "bunching" of these offerings among specific
industries.
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Many of the investor and firm actions shown to be consistent with our
model can also arise in models of nonrational behavior. In such models, media
coverage, public relations and other investor marketing activities could play
an important causal role in creating and sustaining speculative bubbles and
fads among investors.24 Although important in our "rational" model, these
activities are not viewed as primal factors in either the determination of the
investment and financing decisions by firms, or the determination of security
prices. In our model, expanded media coverage of a firm, industry or other
sector of the economy, is stimulated by changes in the same economic
fundamentals that cause firms to change their plans and investors to reassess
their portfolios. Advertising that initially attracts investor attention to a
firm is assumed to leave that firm's investor base unchanged if the underlying
fundamentals do not justify a change.25
The analysis has focused on the equilibrium determination of expenditures
by the firm to expand the breadth of investor cognizance about the firm and
thereby, increase the size of its investor base. In an expanded model with
differences in the depth of investor cognizance across firms, it would pay for
some firms to expend resources to improve the quality or precision of
information available to investors. Thus, much the same analysis could be
applied to provide an endogeneous determination of the firm's estimation risk
in the Bawa-Klein-Barry-Brown models.
iI
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IV. Pending Issues and Extensions of the Model
As stated at the outset, the manifest objective of our analysis is to show
that a reconciling of finance theory with significant empirical violations of
the complete-information, perfect-market model need not require a radical
departure from that paradigm. The especially-simple structure of the model
was selected with that expressed purpose in mind. The highly-specialized
assumptions of the model are, of course, the source of the unambiguous and
strong conclusions about the structure of equilibrium security prices and the
behavior of firms. A careful examination of the robustness of these
conclusions should therefore be undertaken before giving more substantive
empirical consideration to the model. Although such an examination is beyond
the scope of this paper, we provide in this closing section, some preliminary
observations on the likely effects of perturbing the simplifying assumptions
of the model.
The important equation (26), ak = Xk - akXM, still obtains
if the model is generalized to allow an arbitrary variance-covariance
structure among security returns. However, the shadow cost Xk will
depend on which other securities are contained in investor 's information
set. Hence, unlike in (10), the shadow cost will not be the same for all
investors who do not know about security k. It is, moreover, possible that
xi can be negative, which implies that investor j would short-sellk
security k if he knew about it. If, however, the aggregate Xk is a
decreasing function of qk, then the fundamental comparative statics results
derived here will be robust. Judging by analogy from the work of Errunza and
Losq (1985) on mildly-segmented markets, I believe that reasonably-general
-42-
conditions on the covariance structure can be derived to ensure that
axk/aqk < 0.
It seems reasonable to assume that the marginal cost of finding out about
security k would be lower for an investor who already knows about other
securities (perhaps in the same industry) whose returns are strongly
correlated with the return on security k. However, the diversification
benefits from finding out about security k will also be reduced for that
investor. In the context of our underlying information-cost story, it is,
thus, ambiguous how the equilibrium distribution of qk would be affected
between the diagonal and more-general version of the model.2 6
Introducing costly shortsales or their outright prohibition in the model
would render the portfolio actions of investors who know about security k
and who would like to short-sell it indistinguishable from those who simply do
not know about the security. The prohibition of short sales will increase the
likelihood that an investor will not incur the necessary set-up cost to become
informed about security k, and therefore, institutional constraints against
short sales will tend to accentuate the effects derived in our model. The
reason is that the ex-ante information that no action can be taken if the
ex-post information received would otherwise dictate a short sale, lowers the
expected payoff from expending the resources to find out about a security. In
effect, this restriction is equivalent to the investor giving away ex-ante a
put option on the security. Thus, the "lost-opportunity" cost from
prohibition of short sales will cause a larger reduction in expected benefits
for those stocks with larger nonsystematic variances, {a }.
In practice, many institutional investors are prohibited by charter or
general prudence laws from short selling. Even for those who can undertake
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such transactions, the costs of short sales are low only for the larger and
more-widely-held stocks. As it happens, these are also the stocks on which
options and futures (with their less-costly short selling facilities) are
available. Hence, the effect of costly short sales on qk and equilibrium
security prices may be more pronounced for smaller and less-widely-held
securities.
As in the standard complete-information CAPM, our model assumes that
individual investors form their portfolios by direct transactions in
individual firms' securities, and therefore, provides no explicit recognition
of institutional investors. The central issue surrounding the introduction of
financial intermediaries (such as investment companies) into our model is
whether they enjoy sufficiently increasing returns-to-scale to vitiate the
fixed set-up cost information story underlying the assumption that investors
only know about a small subset of the available securities. If K individual
investors pool their resources under a common portfolio manager, then they can
in effect reduce the fixed cost (per investor) of finding out about a security
in proportion to (K - 1)/K. 27 There is surely little doubt that important
benefits accrue to larger-scale investment units by reducing nformation and
transactions costs as well as providing more-skilled portfolio management.
This well-founded observation need not, however, imply that the limiting case
obtains where K is large enough that the institutional investor (and hence,
its clients) become informed about all available securities. To make this
case requires among other things, that the financial institution can
without cost make investors aware of its presence and convince them to buy its
securities. Such an assumption is, of course, inconsistent with the basic
information-cost story underlying our model. Contrary to this argument for
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complete information, there is ample empirical evidence that real-world
portfolio-management firms spend considerable resources on marketing and sales
to increase assets under management.29
As discussed in Section II, individual investors' direct holdings of
individual stocks tend to be highly concentrated. Many of these investors do,
of course, have substantial indirect holdings of stocks through ownership or
beneficial claims on institutional portfolios such as mutual funds, pensions,
trusts and profit-sharing plans. However, the number of such indirect
holdings by each individual investor (e.g., the number of mutual funds held by
one investor) is also small. Even for the largest of institutions, the number
of individual stocks held in a single institutional portfolio represent only a
small fraction of the total number of securities available.
The empirical evidence also suggests considerable overlap in the selected
individual securities held in different institutional portfolios. Moreover,
the relative fractions of traded securities contained in the aggregate of
institutional portfolios appear to differ from their relative fractions in the
market portfolio. These facts support the view that even after accounting for
both direct and indirect holdings, any given investor effectively knows about
only a small fraction of the total number of securities available in the
market place.
To extend the model to explicitly include financial intermediaries, we
need simply posit that for each institutional portfolio, its manager knows
about some securities and does not invest in those he does not know
30
about. Each individual investor in turn knows about some individual
stocks and some institutional portfolios and confines his investments to
31
them. The equilibrium analysis of the extended model would follow the one
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presented here with the aggregate {qk} for individual stocks
determined from both the direct and indirect holdings of individual investors.
Our model assumes "active" investors who select portfolios that are
mean-variance efficient relative to the securities contained in their
information sets. The model can be extended to include investors who follow
specific "passive" portfolio strategies, without causing significant changes
in its substantive conclusions.
A "market indexer" is an investor who makes no judgments about stock
market value and passively holds the market portfolio. By definition, such
investors do not know the expected return on the market portfolio although
they may know its long-run historical average. If AN denotes the number
of indexers, then the equilibrum aggregate demand for security k by this
group is given by xkANW. From (9.b) and (9.c), the aggregate demand for
security k can be written as Dk = NkWAk/60 + xkNW. In
equilibrium, xk = Dk/NW. It follows that the equilibrium xk is given
by (15) where qk = Nk/(N - AN) is the fraction of the active-investor
population that knows about security k. The effect of the indexers on
equilibrium prices is as if they were an active-investor population with
fraction qk of the group knowing about security k. That is, the
equilibrium is the same as one with only active investors where the number
that know about security k is given by Nk - Nk + NkAN/(N -) k k
AN) and qk Nk/N.
If, as may be the case in practice, passive market-indexers hold only a
subset of the market portfolio and if this subset tends to be focused on
larger and more widely-held stocks, then indexers can accentuate the results
derived here by raising the effective qk for those stocks and lowering
__1__ __·14__1_^_^1_____I____ __
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qk for the excluded ones. Similar "tilting" effects would obtain for
investors who select a small number of individual stocks with the strategy
that they are chosen so as to minimize the "residual" variance of the
portfolio return with reference to the market index.
Another example of a passive strategy is the "naive" APT investor who
assumes that with the single common-factor return process given in (2) and a
very large number of securities, n, the optimal portfolio behavior is to
simply combine a security with maximum positive correlation with the common
factor and the riskless security. In our model, such investors will only hold
the forward contract on the common factor in combination with the riskless
security. This strategy is formally equivalent to the optimal behavior for an
active investor who does not know about any of the individual securities
(i.e., X > 0 and wj = 0 for k = l,...,n). Thus, investorsk k
who follow this passive strategy are already accommodated within the analysis
presented here.
Perhaps the most-controversial conclusion of our model is that less
well-known stocks of firms with smaller investor bases tend to have relatively
larger expected returns than in the comparable complete-information model. If
such stocks can be easily identified and if accurate estimates of alphas can
be acquired at low cost, then professional money managers could improve
performance by following a mechanical investment strategy tilted toward these
stocks. If a sufficient quantity of such investments were undertaken, then
this "extra" excess return would disappear. This prospect is surely a
modulating force on the empirical magnitude of these anomalous returns.
However, as discussed in our "Prologue," the time frame over which such
corrective action takes place can be considerable and even in the long run, it
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may not be complete. Moreover, the profits from such strategies are
bounded and at least in part, illusionary.
Consider the hypothetical example of the $200 million firm discussed in
Section III. Suppose that the equilibrium expected return is 13 percent in
our model and 10 percent in the comparable complete-information-model. The
effect of this extra-return requirement on share price depends on its
anticipated persistence over time as discussed in footnote 20. If the
expected duration of this extra-return is one year, then the effect on current
market price is about 3 percent or a 6 million undervaluation. If it applies
in perpetuity, then the market price will be 23 percent below its
complete-information value, or a $46 million undervaluation. Even at this
extreme, the aggregate dollar amount involved is, for example, less than a
change of a nickel a share in the price of Exxon stock. Many large
institutional investors such as registered investment companies are normally
restricted from purchasing more than 5 percent of the outstanding stock of a
company. Thus, the total maximum potential gain to the institutional investor
is between $0.3 and $2.3 million and not $6 to t46 million. The latter is
only relevant for a takeover bid, which, as an empirical matter, typically
requires a substantial premium over market price. Moreover, given our
analysis, it is perhaps realistic to assume that an attempt to buy or sell 5
percent of such a company will have an appreciable effect on price. Indeed,
the largest feasible position that can be acquired without significantly
affecting price may be considerably smaller than the statutory limit for the
institution. Thus, a rational manager of a large institutional portfolio may
not take a position in a security with a seemingly-large incremental expected
rate of return if the incremental expected dollar return from the position
__11_1_ ____ ___I___IIL_II__I11111___
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would be too small to justify the additional information, monitoring and
general nuisance costs.
In summary, financial markets dominated by rational agents may
nevertheless produce anomalous behavior relative to the perfect-market model.
Institutional complexities and information costs may cause considerable
variations in the time scales over which different types of anomalies are
expected to be eliminated in the market place. Whether or not the specific
information inefficiency posited can be sustained in the long run, the model
may nevertheless provide some intermediate insights into the behavior of
security prices.
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FOOTNOTES
*J.C. Penney Professor of Management, A.P. Sloan School of Management,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. My thanks to F. Black, C. Huang,
S. Myers, R. Ruback and M. Scholes for helpful comments. I am grateful
to J. Meehan for computational assistance.
1 Elements of this evolution are described in Merton (1983, 1987,
forthcoming).
2 The impact of efficient market theory, portfolio selection, risk analysis
and contingent-claim pricing theory on money management and capital
budgeting procedures is evident from even a casual comparison of current
practices with those of twenty years ago. Financial research has also
influenced legal proceedings such as appraisal cases, rate of return
hearings for regulated industries, takeover rules, and "prudent-person"
laws governing behavior of fiduciaries. The role of finance theory in the
current wave of financial innovations is well documented in numerous
articles in the financial press. See also Van Horne (1985).
3 Cf., "Symposium on Some Anomalous Evidence on Capital Market Efficiency,"
Journal of Financial Economics, June-September 1978; Black (1986), Summers
(1986) and R.C. Merton (1987).
4 Black (1986) describes many of the puzzles and attributes them to noise.
Indeed, he predicts that, "...research will be seen as a process leading
to reliable and relevant conclusions only very rarely, because of the
noise that creeps in at every step." (p. 530)
5 So writes the sociologist of science, R.K. Merton (1987), who calls this
particular form of ignorance, "specified ignorance." Noting its common
occurrence across both time and scientific fields, he points out that
"...as the history of thought, both great and small, attests, specified
ignorance is often a first step toward supplanting that ignorance with
knowled&e."
6 For various views on this issue, see the papers in Hogarth and Reder
(1986). From these papers, it is evident that finance, and especially,
speculative markets, provides a potentially-rich "strategic research site"
(see R.K. Merton, 1987) for psychologists and sociologists as well as
economists.
7 In a slightly different context, Miller (1986, p. S467) writes: "That we
abstract from all these stories in building our models is not because the
stories are uninteresting, but because they may be too interesting and
thereby distract us from the pervasive market forces that should be our
principal concern."
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8 In tests of market efficiency, it is typically assumed that actual
investors in real time knew (or should have known) the model and the
statistical results derived by the researcher. As is well known, the
large volatility of stock prices often requires a very long time series
before a statistically-significant, estimated mean can be derived.
Perhaps such studies should report the length of time before the
discovered anomaly exceeded generally-accepted confidence intervals.
9 Cf. Friend and Blume (1975) and Blume and Friend (1978,1986).
10 Cf. Amihud and Mendelson (1986); Brennan (1970); Constantinides (1984);
Errunza and Losq (1985); Levy (1978); and Miller (1977).
11 See Bhattacharya (forthcoming) for an extensive review.
12 Klein and Bawa (1977); Barry and Brown (1984, 1985, 1986).
13 Although larger volatility and lower substitutability among equities will
surely make the derived effects greater for equity securities than debt,
the same idea applies to all securities. For example, a bond trader who
responds quickly to interest rate news by trading U.S. Treasury bonds, may
not be willing to trade GNMA mortgage-backed bonds unless he has borne the
set-up costs necessary to understand the effect on price of the prepayment
feature of these bonds.
14 As with the firm, information from brokerage or investment services will
only influence an investor's decisions if he knows about the source and
has incurred the set-up cost to properly calibrate the information.
Similarly, the investor knows about only a small number of money
management institutions and if he does not know about an institution, he
will not invest with it.
15 See Arbel and Strebel (1982); Arbell, Carvell and Strebel (1983); and
especially, Arbel (1985, p. 5); and Strebel and Carvell (1987, Chapter 1).
16 The shadow cost is measured in units of expected return. Given the return
structure (2) and (3), equation (10) for the shadow cost applies not only
for the mean-variance criterion, but for all concave utility maximizers.
17 If we maintain the assumption of identical preferences but allow for a
non-uniform distribution of wealth among investors, then qk becomes
the fraction of national wealth owned by investors who know about
security k.
18 As an empirical matter, the complete market portfolio is not observable.
Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972) use an equally-weighted portfolio of the
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securities in the sample as their market surrogate. Under these
conditions, the claim that E[Xkl k] = i is reinforced because
M n k/n .M 1k
19 Cf. Friend and Blume (1975) and Mehra and Prescott (1985, p. 154).
20 A proper development of this conclusion requires a dynamic version of the
model. In such a model, current (informed) shareholders of firm k would
have expectations about the future time path of qk. If a favorable
story implies an upward revision in those anticipations, then the price
should rise immediately, even if there is a time lag before the newly-
informed investors take positions. Similarly, an unfavorable story
implying a reduction in the anticipated growth in the investor base should
cause an immediate price decline. As in the other analyses, this effect
is likely to be most important for smaller and lesser-known firms.
21 In this case, the "new" information that affects price is the report
itself (through its anticipated effect on the investor base) and not the
substantive information contained in the report which is already known by
all those currently trading in the stock.
22 If the firm already has Nk investors in its base, then we adjust
the cost function to F(Nk) - F(Nk) with the choice constraint
Nk > Nk . The cost function is likely to vary across firms and
in particular, firms with larger sk will probably have a higher cost
F(Nk) for every Nk.
23 For deep-in-the-money rights, arbitrageurs, if necessary, will ensure
exercise by buying rights and shorting stock. These transactions will not
cause an increase in the investor base, since purchasers of the shorted
stock are current shareholders.
24 The media would surely play a key role in creating self-fulfilling
prophecies, Merton (1948). Although our model provides a rational
explanation for the response in stock price to these activities, it does
not, as an empirical matter, rule out nonrational behavior. In principle,
one could, however, test the fads hypothesis by determining whether the
price changes are transient or permanent, provided, of course, that the
half-lives of fads are not too long.
25 As in the marketing literature generally, we would expect that in a
micro-micro description of information transmission to investors, firms
and their agents would take account of cognitive psychological factors
such as Tversky-Kahneman (1981) "framing" in selecting the form and medium
to present information. Our model assumes that systematic attempts to
exploit cognitive errors among investors will not have material effects.
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26 Much the same discussion would apply to extending the model to include
multiple factors in the context of the Arbitrage Pricing Model.
27 The issue of increasing-returns-to-scale arises frequently in the analysis
of information production. For example, the same question raised here
applies to the Grossman-Stiglitz (1976) model as well.
28 For example, one must also assume no important intra-organizational
information-transmission or agency-type costs that would limit the size or
the number of employees of the financial institution.
29 Cf. Pamela Sebastian, "Mass Marketing Becomes Driving Force," Wall Street
Journal, December 8, 1986, p. 47. Marketing costs are significant for
both retail and institutional (e.g., pension plan sponsors) sales.
30 Institutional managers may avoid some stocks and limit the size of
investment in others for other reasons such as monitoring costs,
liquidity, prudence, and insider or "five-percent" rules.
31 An investor may "know about" a particular institutional portfolio and not
another, because a salesman has contacted him about one and not the other
or because of institutional restrictions, e.g., his employer may have a
defined-contribution pension plan that limits his investment allocations
to selected institutional portfolios.
32 If there are significant marketing costs associated with educating
investors about the benefits of a "neglected-stock" fund, then money
managers may be reluctant to undertake that task because, for such a
generic product, they may not be able to charge fees sufficient to recover
these costs in a competitive system. The issue is analogous to the
"free-rider" problem of a public good.
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